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Decision-making is motivated by the possibility of obtaining reward and/or avoiding
punishment. Though many have investigated behavior associated with appetitive or
aversive outcomes, few have examined behaviors that rely on both. Fewer still have
addressed questions related to how anticipated appetitive and aversive outcomes interact
to alter neural signals related to expected value, motivation, and salience. Here we
review recent rodent, monkey, and human research that address these issues. Further
development of this area will be fundamental to understanding the etiology behind human
psychiatric diseases and cultivating more effective treatments.
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INTRODUCTION
Decision making is a complex process by which an organism must
weigh multiple possible outcomes against current and long term
goals before deciding on a course of action. Possible outcomes
can be grouped into the probability of obtaining something
rewarding or avoiding an outcome that is negative or punish-
ing. Although an established body of literature has extensively
studied neural systems involved in both of these functions, very
few have set out to explicitly study how these neural systems
directly reconcile both appetitive and aversive neural signals in
a single task. Even fewer have addressed questions related to
how anticipated appetitive and aversive outcomes interact to
alter neural signals related to expected value, motivation, and
salience. Here, we review studies that have addressed this issue
in a number of key brain areas, all of which have been shown to
exhibit neural activity modulated by expectation of appetitive and
aversive stimuli when studied independently. We first review the
non-human animal literature and then review studies performed
in humans.
We know from a vast literature that neural activity of several
regions throughout the brain are modulated by expected out-
come, whether it be appetitive or aversive. It is widely assumed
that this activity corresponds to an internal representation of
how appetitive or aversive that expected outcome is. However,
in many cases, change in responses relating to the expectation
of emotionally charged outcomes alters other functions related to
motivation, salience, arousal and attention that serve to facilitate
response mechanisms to approach or avoid.
For example, an association of a particular odor that pre-
viously predicted the presence of a predator would be highly
salient though lead to a negative association with that odor, while
another odor may predict a salient rewarding stimulus, like ripe
fruit, but with a positive valence. So while the general idea that
appetitive and aversive systems oppose each other in the brain
seems logical and useful (Solomon and Corbit, 1974; Daw et al.,
2002), stimuli of either valence may drive arousal or enhance
attention to stimuli of learned associations (Anderson, 2005; Lang
and Davis, 2006; Phelps et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2011).
Thus, a key problem is how to dissociate value from these
other co-varying factors. A common approach is to vary appet-
itive and aversive stimuli in the same task. In these types of
studies there are typically three basic trial types, such that: (1)
a conditioned stimulus (CS) predicts a large reward; (2) a CS
predicts a neutral condition or a small (or no) reward; and (3)
a CS predicts a small (or no) reward with the threat of an aversive
outcome. In animal studies, the aversive outcome may range
in quality from time-outs, delivery of a bitter quinine solution,
electric shock, or air-puff to the eye (Rolls et al., 1989; Roesch
and Olson, 2004; Anstrom et al., 2009; Brischoux et al., 2009;
Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009; Roesch et al., 2010a; Lammel
et al., 2011; Bissonette et al., 2013). In human studies, the aversive
outcome may be loss of money, an unpleasant liquid, shock, or
an unpleasant odor (Delgado et al., 2000; Anderson et al., 2003;
Small et al., 2003; Cooper and Knutson, 2008; Carter et al., 2009;
Litt et al., 2011; Choi et al., 2013). If neurons encode value,
activity should show a decreasing relationship during appetitive,
neutral, and aversive trials (Figure 1). If appetitive and aversive
stimuli are encoded by independent populations, then neurons
should be modulated by either appetitive or aversive stimuli but
not both. Finally, if activity is modulated by factors that vary
with the strength of appetitive and aversive stimuli, neurons
should respond with the same “sign” for appetitive and aver-
sive trials compared to neutral trials (Figure 1). Although the
relationship between neuronal responses and blood-oxygenation-
related activity obtained via functional MRI is complex (Goense
and Logothetis, 2008), it is typically assumed that the same
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FIGURE 1 | Logic used to dissociate “value” from other motivational
variables. If activity in a region represents “value” signals, then activation
in that region for appetitive stimuli is expected to be greater than aversive
stimuli, with responses to neutral somewhere in between. However, if
activity represents salience or intensity, activation during both appetitive
and aversive stimuli would be greater than that observed to neutral stimuli.
pattern of activity applies to them both—thus, the same type
of relationships should be observed at the levels of voxels or
regions.
Below we first focus on animal studies that have used similar
paradigms to try to dissociate value from motivation, salience,
arousal and intensity. We then turn to functional MRI studies in
humans.
ORBITOFRONTAL CORTEX (OFC)
Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) encodes expectations about future
appetitive and aversive outcomes that are critical for guiding
learning and decision-making (Schoenbaum et al., 1998; Roesch
and Olson, 2004; Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005; Plassmann
et al., 2010; Morrison et al., 2011; Morrison and Salzman,
2011). For example, neurons in OFC are modulated by cues
that predict different appetitive outcomes, such as different food
stuffs and magnitudes of reward; other OFC neurons signal
when an aversive stimulus is anticipated, such as quinine or air-
puff. However, since motivation and value were hard to disen-
tangle in most of these experiments, it was unknown whether
neural signals genuinely represented the value of the predicted
outcome, or the motivational level associated with obtaining
reward or avoiding aversive outcomes. For example, neurons in
OFC fire strongly when monkeys anticipate a desirable outcome
(Schoenbaum et al., 1998, 1999), but if that outcome is paired
with a chance for another, more preferable outcome (Wallis and
Miller, 2003), or is devalued through satiation (Rolls et al., 1989),
then the rate of firing decreases. This activity modulation might
reflect the decrease in value, but it might also reflect changes
in motivation. A similar situation holds true for OFC neurons
that predict aversive outcomes; activity might reflect how aver-
sive the stimulus is or how motivated the animal is to avoid
it.
To address these issues Roesch and Olson (2004) designed
a task to dissociate value from motivation by simultaneously
manipulating reward and punishment. The monkeys performed
a memory-guided saccade task during which two cues pre-
sented at the beginning of each trial indicated the size of
the reward the monkey would receive in the event of success
(one or three drops of juice) and the size of a penalty that
would be incurred in the event of failure (a 1 s or 8 s time-
out). Behavioral measures indicated that the monkeys found
the large reward appetitive and the punishment aversive; mon-
keys chose a large reward more often than a small one and
avoided a large penalty more often than a small one. More
importantly, monkeys were more motivated by large rewards and
penalties as compared to smaller ones. Under both the large-
reward and large-penalty conditions, the monkeys broke fixa-
tion less often, made fewer errors, and were faster to respond,
relative to neutral conditions (Figure 2A). Thus dissociation of
value and motivation was achieved via simultaneous manipu-
lation of appetitive and aversive outcomes (Roesch and Olson,
2004).
With this task it was predicted that neurons sensitive to
the degree of motivation should respond with similar changes
in firing rate to increasing the size of either the promised
reward or the threatened penalty, thus paralleling the behavior.
Indeed, premotor (PM) neurons that are strongly associated
with motor output fired continuously during the delay between
predictive cues and the behavioral response at a higher rate
when either a large reward or a large penalty was expected
(Figures 2D, E). Since activity persisted throughout the delay
into the time when the monkey was making the behavioral
response and because enhancement was observed in neu-
rons with response direction selectivity, changes in firing were
interpreted as reflecting motivational enhancement of motor
output, as opposed to general arousal or salience. Accord-
ingly, activity in PM reflected the motivational impact of the
trial being performed, not its overall value, demonstrating
a dissociation between motivation from value at the neural
level.
Since OFC is more associated with more emotional/evaluative
functions than motor areas, like PM, we expected that OFC
neurons would better reflect the value associated with cues
and reward delivery. Indeed, in stark contrast to PM neurons,
OFC neurons fired most strongly for cues that predicted large
reward (with small penalty) and least strongly for cues that
predicted large-penalty (with small reward) relative to neutral
conditions (small reward and small penalty; Figures 2B–C). Thus
the strength of responding in OFC reflected the value conveyed
by the combination of reward and penalty cues. Other studies
have replicated these results and have further shown that other
populations of OFC neurons do not represent the overall value
associated with a given situation, but the actual offers being
made and the option eventually chosen during performance of a
choice task (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008; Hosokawa
et al., 2007; Morrison et al., 2011). Collectively these studies
have shown that OFC has all the signals necessary, at the sin-
gle unit level, to make reward-guided decisions, as opposed
to facilitating behavior through general motivational mecha-
nisms under the influence of predictive appetitive and aversive
events.
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BASOLATERAL AMYGDALA (ABL)
Although the mainstream view holds that amygdala is important
for acquiring and storing associative information related to both
appetitive and aversive outcomes (LeDoux, 2000), there have been
hints in the literature that amygdala also supports other functions
related to associative learning, such as signaling of attention,
uncertainty, and intensity (Saddoris et al., 2005; Belova et al.,
2007; Tye and Janak, 2007; Tye et al., 2010; Morrison et al., 2011).
At the single neuron level, basolateral amygdala (ABL) is
modulated by the predictability of both appetitive and aver-
sive events, specifically when expectancies are violated (Belova
et al., 2007; Roesch et al., 2010a,b; Tye et al., 2010). In other
words, ABL neurons increase firing when outcomes are unex-
pectedly delivered or omitted, events that are highly salient
and attention grabbing. We have shown that activity in ABL
increases when rewards are unexpectedly delivered (appetitive)
or omitted (aversive) in a task in which expected reward varies
in size and time to delivery (Roesch et al., 2010a). Others have
reported increased activity in ABL when rats were expecting
reward, but not delivered during extinction (Tye et al., 2010).
In primates, unexpected delivery of appetitive and aversive (air-
puff) outcomes during performance of a trace conditioning task
with reversals caused amygdala neurons to fire more strongly
than when the outcome was totally predictable (Belova et al.,
2007). Additionally, it appears that the same populations of
ABL neurons which represent appetitive stimuli were also acti-
vated by aversive stimuli, regardless of the particular sensory
modality from which the experience comes (Shabel and Janak,
2009). This suggests a larger role for ABL in signaling the
need for attention in the presence of cues, rather than signal-
ing the associated value of those cues. All of this suggests that
amygdala does more than just signal appetitive and aversive
stimuli.
Together, these reports suggest that ABL integrates informa-
tion about appetitive and aversive events and their intensity or
salience, possibly in the service of modifying behavior via signal-
ing errors in predictions or recruitment of attentional/executive
functions. However, these reports tend to focus on modulation of
activity during delivery of appetitive and aversive outcomes. Much
less is known about modulation by salience during sampling of
cues that predict outcomes. Notably, modulation of amygdala
firing for cues that predict appetitive and aversive outcomes
appears to occur in separate neurons, suggesting that activity
during this period is more related to the valence of the expected
outcome. Likewise, cues presented after unexpected events or
during response conflict when enhanced attention is necessary do
not elicit changes in activity as do errors in reward prediction or
commission as observed in other areas, such as anterior cingulate.
Thus, ABL might be critical for reporting attentional need, arousal
or intensity during sampling of unconditioned stimuli in the
service of learning to predict the appetitive and aversive nature
of the outcomes during sampling of conditioned stimuli. This
is consistent with the finding that ABL interference disrupts
development of cue selectivity in other areas, such as OFC and
ventral striatum (VS; Hatfield et al., 1996; Schoenbaum et al.,
2003a,b; Stalnaker et al., 2007, 2009).
VENTRAL STRIATUM (VS)
The connectivity of VS with OFC and ABL suggests that it might
also represent the value of expected outcomes. This would be
consistent with its proposed role as the “critic” in actor-critic
models, where VS generates value predictions about future out-
comes, which are used by dopamine (DA) neurons to compute
prediction errors (PEs) necessary for updating actions polices in
the “actor”, namely dorsal striatum (Houk et al., 1995; Sutton,
1998; Haber et al., 2000; Joel et al., 2002; Redish, 2004; Ikemoto,
2007; Niv and Schoenbaum, 2008; Takahashi et al., 2008; Padoa-
Schioppa, 2011; van der Meer and Redish, 2011). However, VS
has traditionally been thought to be the “limbic-motor” interface
critical for motivating behaviors. Under this framework, one
might predict that VS is critical for motivating or facilitating
behaviors in response to both appetitive and aversive stimuli—
and not for representing value per se. Consistent with both of these
theories, pharmacological manipulations of VS impact motivated
behaviors dependent on value expectations during a variety of
tasks (Wadenberg et al., 1990; Berridge and Robinson, 1998;
Blokland, 1998; Ikemoto and Panksepp, 1999; Di Ciano et al.,
2001; Cardinal et al., 2002a,b; Di Chiara, 2002; Salamone and
Correa, 2002; Giertler et al., 2003; Wakabayashi et al., 2004; Yun
et al., 2004; Floresco et al., 2008; Gruber et al., 2009; Ghods-
Sharifi and Floresco, 2010; Stopper and Floresco, 2011), includ-
ing reward seeking (Ikemoto and Panksepp, 1999), cost-benefit
analysis (Floresco et al., 2008; Stopper and Floresco, 2011), and
delay/effort discounting (Cardinal et al., 2001; Ghods-Sharifi and
Floresco, 2010).
Motivation is a complex psychological feature, likely aris-
ing from assessments of physiological states, understanding and
attending to current environmental cues, past reinforcement
history, and assessing expected value associated with current
contexts. In this light, pharmacological manipulations of the VS
will only likely uncover a portion of the story, while single unit
recording may uncover separate yet concurrent roles for a brain
region, difficult to piece apart with pharmacological work.
Previous single unit work has clearly demonstrated that fir-
ing in VS is modulated by the value associated with cues that
predict reward in rats (Carelli and Deadwyler, 1994; Setlow
et al., 2003; Janak et al., 2004; Nicola et al., 2004; Ito and
Doya, 2009; van der Meer and Redish, 2009; Kalenscher et al.,
2010; Lansink et al., 2010; van der Meer et al., 2010; Day
et al., 2011; Goldstein et al., 2012) and monkeys (Schultz
et al., 1992; Shidara and Richmond, 2004; Cromwell et al.,
2005; Kim et al., 2009; Nakamura et al., 2012) performing
a variety of instrumental tasks, including go/nogo (Schultz
et al., 1992; Setlow et al., 2003), lever pressing (Carelli and
Deadwyler, 1994; Janak et al., 2004; Shidara and Richmond,
2004; Cromwell et al., 2005; Day et al., 2011), discrimina-
tion (Nicola et al., 2004; van der Meer et al., 2010; Goldstein
et al., 2012), maze running (van der Meer and Redish, 2009;
Kalenscher et al., 2010; Lansink et al., 2010), and eye movement
paradigms (Kim et al., 2009; Nakamura et al., 2012). However,
from these studies, it was unclear what exactly VS responses
represented because none of these studies had independently
manipulated value from motivation. To address this issue we
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FIGURE 2 | Premotor and Orbitofrontal cortex encode motivation and
value, respectively. Trials fell into three categories defined by
reward-penalty combination: large reward (large reward and small penalty),
neutral (small reward and small penalty), and large penalty (small reward
and large penalty). (A) Performance measures sensitive to reward and
penalty size. Penalty choice rate: trials on which the monkeys chose
penalty expressed as a fraction of all trials on which they chose reward or
penalty. Fixation break rate: trials terminated by a fixation break expressed
as a percentage of all trials. Reaction time: average interval between
fixation spot offset and saccade initiation on all trials in which the monkey
made a saccade in the rewarded direction. Asterisks (all planned
comparisons): statistically significant differences at P < 0.001. (B, C)
Neuronal activity in OFC reflects the value conveyed by the incentive
cues. (B) Shown are data from a single neuron firing during the cue
period at a rate that was especially high for large reward and especially
low for large penalty. (C) Mean firing rate as a function of time under the
three incentive conditions for all 176 OFC neurons. (D, E) Neuronal
activity in premotor (PM) reflects the motivational impact of the incentive
cues. (D) Shown are data from a single neuron firing throughout the trial
at a rate that was high for large reward and large penalty. (E) Mean firing
rate as a function of time under the three incentive conditions for all 135
PM neurons. Adapted from Roesch and Olson (2004).
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adopted a similar behavioral strategy in rats as we did in pri-
mates, varying expected reward and punishment so that value
and motivation signals could be dissociated (Bissonette et al.,
2013).
Rats were trained on a task in which illumination of a left
or right light indicated the location of reward. Prior to the
spatial cue, an odor informed the rat of the size of reward
and punishment that would result upon correct and incorrect
performance, respectively. On two trial-types, there was no risk
of punishment, just the potential of a large or small reward for
a correct response. On a third trial-type, a small reward was
promised for accurate performance, but there was also a risk
of punishment (quinine) if the rat performed the task incor-
rectly. Rats were more accurate and faster to move down to
the fluid well in response to the lights on large reward and
quinine risk trials compared to small reward trials, demonstrating
higher motivation on these trials relative to small reward trials
(Figure 3A).
Remarkably, we found that single units in VS encoded both
value and motivation. An example of the former is illustrated in
Figure 3B. During odor sampling this neuron fired the most and
the least for cues that predicted reward and punishment, respec-
tively. This same neuron also fired during delivery of reward, but
did not merely encode reward consumption, as evidenced by ele-
vated firing when reward was omitted on error trials (Figure 3D).
These results suggest that neurons in VS reflect the expected value
of the reward during cue presentation and after the behavioral
response. Thus, neurons in VS carry predictive value signals
during odor sampling.
This relationship with value was mostly present in the activity
of neurons that increased firing to both odor cues and reward
delivery. Cue-responsive neurons that showed decreases in firing
to reward delivery better reflected the degree of motivation asso-
ciated conditioned stimuli, as illustrated in Figures 3C, E. For
this neuron, activity was stronger for odor cues that predicted
large reward and the risk of quinine punishment relative to
small reward trials, consistent with representations of enhanced
motivation.
Our results suggest that VS fulfills both evaluative and moti-
vational functions, likely via separate neuronal populations, and
might be required for integrating both types of information
that are central to actor-critic models, as well frameworks that
view the VS as a “limbic-motor” interface (Bissonette et al.,
2013). All of this work features VS as a common junction
point to act, possibly concurrently, to signal value and moti-
vation which leads to the invigoration of particular behavioral
actions over others. This idea is consistent with pharmaco-
logical studies suggested that DA in the VS had more to do
with encoding incentive salience and motivation, rather than
evaluative functions (Salamone, 1986; Salamone et al., 1991;
McCullough and Salamone, 1992; Salamone, 1994; Koch et al.,
2000; Berridge, 2007; Lex and Hauber, 2010; Salamone et al.,
2012; Salamone and Correa, 2012; Nunes et al., 2013) and
others that show that VS lesions disrupt rats ability to choice
between differently valued rewards and to update behavior after
devaluation of expected outcomes (Singh et al., 2010; Burton
et al., 2013).
A
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FIGURE 3 | Ventral striatal neurons encode both value and motivation.
Rats performed a task during which two odors indicated the size (large or
small) of the reward to be delivered at the end of the trial. If an error was
committed on large and small reward trials, no reward was delivered. A
third odor indicated that a small reward would be delivered on correct trials
and that quinine would be delivered when rats responded to the wrong
well. (A) Average lick rate over time during recording sessions. Black =
delivery of large reward; Dark gray = delivery of small reward when there
was no risk; Light gray = delivery of small reward when there was a risk of
quinine. Dashed gray = delivery of quinine on risk trials during which rats
went to the wrong fluid well. Average percent correct for the three trial
types. Average time taken to move from the odor port to the fluid well in
response to the spatial cue lights. (B–C) Single cell example of neurons that
exhibited firing patterns consistent with value and motivation encoding on
(Continued )
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FIGURE 3 | Continued
correct trials for the 3 trial-types: large reward, small reward, and
punishment. Activity is aligned to odor onset (left of dashed box) and
reward delivery (right of dashed box). Inset: average waveform (not
inverted). (D–E) Average normalized firing over all neurons that showed
significant increases to both odor cues and reward delivery and those
neurons that showed significant increased and decreased firing to cues and
rewards, respectively. Firing rates were normalized by subtracting the
baseline and dividing by the standard deviation. Ribbons represent standard
error of the mean (SEM). Blue asterisks indicate significant differences
between average firing during the odor epoch (gray bar) between large
reward and small reward trials (blue versus yellow; t-test; p < 0.05). Red
asterisks are the comparison between quinine punishment and small
reward trials (red versus yellow; t-test; p < 0.05). The odor epoch did not
include time when lights were on. Gray dashed = onset of odors. Black
dashed = earliest possible time lights could turn on. Black arrow marks the
average time of reward delivery. Adapted from Bissonette et al. (2013).
DOPAMINE
Signals from midbrain DA neurons play a critical role in rein-
forcement learning by providing a physiological correlate to the
well-studied PE. This PE signal guides goal-directed behavior
by informing the system which aspects of the environment are
appetitive or aversive and initiating actions in order to obtain
the good and avoid the bad (Schultz, 1997). Phasic bursts or
pauses in neuronal activity, together with resulting neurotrans-
mitter release, encodes this PE signal. The PE signal measures the
difference between an expected outcome and the actual outcome
in order to inform future behavior. A better-than-expected out-
come activates dopaminergic neurons (positive PE) resulting in
neurotransmitter release, while a worse-than-expected outcome
(negative PE) induces a pause in dopaminergic firing. A fully
predictable outcome elicits no change in firing of DA neurons.
The same firing pattern applies for sensory cues that come to
predict or give information about future rewards. Thus, DA firing
and release tends to shift away from the delivery of primary
rewards as they come to be predicted by cues during learning,
resulting in more or less firing for cues that predict appetitive and
aversive outcomes, respectively.
Based on the mismatch of expectation and consequence, the
DA signal acts as a teaching mechanism, updating expectations
and potential behavioral responses based on feedback received
from the environment. DA neurons that fire synchronously and
release DA as a result, are reinforced and are more likely to be
activated in the future, promoting paired behaviors. The syn-
chronized firing of dopaminergic neurons follows Hebb’s idea
that “neurons that fire together, wire together”, but DA must
be released in order for reinforcement learning to occur and
the synaptic connection between neurons to be strengthened
(Montague et al., 1996; Schultz, 1998; Bromberg-Martin et al.,
2010). Most of the value signaling described in the brain areas
above likely relies on DA to form associations between stimuli and
outcomes during learning and decision-making.
Although PE signaling is often studied under paradigms that
require animals to approach appetitive stimuli, PE theory holds
true for DA signals related to avoiding aversive stimuli, such as air
puff and shock. In primates, neurons that encode reward PEs are
depressed by unexpected air puff and visual cues that predict them
(Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). Furthermore, DA firing increases
when an expected air puff is omitted, an event that is more
appetitive or better than expected. A similar story is true in rats
performing an instrumental escape-avoidance paradigm. Oleson
et al. (2012) showed that phasic DA activity to cue presentation
can predict if rats will successfully avoid an upcoming foot shock.
Successful avoidance behavior was contingent upon DA release
time-locked to the warning light. DA was released at the time
of the avoided shock and during cue presentation of successful
avoidance trials. Thus, as with appetitive paradigms, DA signals
adhere to the general rule of firing more or less strongly for cues
and outcomes that are better or worse than expected, respectively
(Oleson et al., 2012). Importantly, this signal is dependent on
input from OFC (Takahashi et al., 2011).
Notably, not all DA neurons transmit reward PE signals. Other,
anatomically discrete, DA neurons appear to be more concerned
about the motivational salience of appetitive and aversive stimuli
(Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009). These DA neurons are trig-
gered by both appetitive and aversive outcomes and the cues
that predict them. In experiments where visual stimuli predict
either reward or air-puff, these DA neurons fire more strongly for
delivery of these outcomes and the cues that predict them, relative
to neutral trials where there is no reward or air-puff. Interestingly,
these two types of DA neurons, referred to as value and salience
encoding neurons, are somewhat segregated in evaluative VTA
and SNc, with value encoding cells mostly located in VTA and
motivational salience DA neurons in SNc. There exists additional
support for the idea that a subset of VTA DA neurons fire
preferentially for aversive stimuli in rats, including social defeat,
aversive foot shock (Anstrom et al., 2009; Brischoux et al., 2009)
and pain inducing plantar injection of formalin to mice (Lammel
et al., 2011). Evidence supports the notion that aversive-preferring
or salience DA neurons project preferentially to the prefrontal
cortex (PFC) and the core of nucleus accumbens (NAc), while
reward-preferring or PE DA neurons project preferentially to the
ventromedial PFC and the shell of NAc (Bromberg-Martin et al.,
2010). Given this data, and the aforementioned idea that these
DA neurons may be encoding salience, it seems likely that such a
signal would be critical for driving attention/motivation to salient
(appetitive or aversive) events promoting learning in regions that
these neurons project to, whereas PEs signal might be critical
for specifically updating representations of associations between
events and their respective outcomes. Thus, DA signals value
in the form of PEs, supporting functions related to approach,
evaluation and value learning, and also motivational salience,
supporting functions related to orienting, attention, and arousal
(Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010).
PARIETAL CORTEX AND ANTERIOR CINGULATE CORTEX
(ACC)
The most recent debate about value versus salience has focused
on the parietal cortex. Parietal neurons have been shown to fire
at a rate, dependent on the value of expected actions (action-
value) and this signal is critical for making economic decisions
about which action produces a better reward. Recently, Leathers
and Olson (2012) reported that primate lateral intraparietal (LIP)
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neurons fire most strongly when a saccade is associated with a
large versus small reward. Importantly, they also showed that the
same neurons fired more strongly for cues that predicted a large
versus small penalty. They suggest that the activity of LIP neurons
encode the motivational salience of a cue, rather than the value
necessary for decision-making.
In a rebuttal paper, Newsome et al. (2013) suggested that
Leathers and Olson (2012) did not replicate delay-period activity
as observed in previous experiments, calling into question the
population of parietal neurons studied and the ability of the task
to tap into these functions that capture action-value (Newsome
et al., 2013). Subsequently, Leathers and Olson (2013) replied by
pointing out that the key findings of their initial study, namely,
that stronger activity was correlated with larger, rather than
smaller penalty cues and that neurons signaled salience earlier in
the trial during the decision process, were not in question, and
that these correlates were found in cells that fired across delays the
preceded the response. They suggest that the fact that salience, not
value, is encoded by parietal cortex in this task suggests that value
encoding is not a general function of parietal cortex. Further work
is necessary to determine in what contexts parietal neurons might
reflect salience versus value.
Other cortical areas thought to be involved in attention have
been recently discussed in the realm of reward-related decision-
making and reinforcement learning. Single neurons in macaque
ACC show correlates related to unsigned PEs (Hayden et al.,
2011), potentially signaling the necessity for additional resources
in the face of signaling a need for behavioral modification. Using
a variable size/delay task, Bryden et al. (2011) demonstrated rat
ACC signaled errors and signaled the need for additional atten-
tional resources during unexpected shifts in value in the same
task used to investigate error signing in ABL (Bryden et al., 2011).
Unlike activity in ABL, ACC firing was significantly stronger after
both unexpected appetitive and aversive events during and before
sampling of cues on subsequent trials. This signal likely reflects
the salience or attention that is drawn to conditioned stimuli so
that contingencies can be updated during learning.
These data are contrasted a bit by work in rhesus monkeys
demonstrating ACC encoding of value as it relates to integrating
previous outcomes with current choices (Kennerley et al., 2011).
Indeed, additional research has suggested that medial PFC (which
included parts of ACC) in rhesus monkeys signal both positive
and negative PEs of action values (Matsumoto et al., 2007). Others
have reported that distinct regions in ventromedial PFC encode
rewards and punishments, with ventral and dorsal aspects being
more active for appetitive and aversive trial-types, respectively
(Monosov and Hikosaka, 2012). The fact that value and salience
signals in ACC and parietal cortex appear to go hand in hand
are consistent with the need for attentional control to ensure
neural processes are prioritized depending on expected events
and current behavioral strategy. Indeed neural correlates related
to value predictions and spatial attention have been shown to be
integrated in clusters of neurons in primate PFC (Kaping et al.,
2011). Further research will need to be done to fully separate
prefrontal and parietal contributions to signaling value, salience
or both using a novel tasks that varies both appetitive and aversive
outcomes.
HUMAN STUDIES
In parallel with the animal literature, human studies have impli-
cated midbrain dopaminergic regions and their projection sites
in the striatum and OFC during appetitive processing (Schultz
et al., 2000; O’Doherty, 2004; Delgado, 2007; Haber and Knutson,
2010) and regions such as the amygdala and anterior insula during
aversive processing (Adolphs and Tranel, 2000; LeDoux, 2000;
Craig, 2002, 2009; Davis et al., 2010) Importantly, ventral and
dorsal striatal regions are also involved during aversive processing
(Jensen et al., 2003; Pruessner et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2008),
while there is some evidence for amygdala and anterior insula
activity during appetitive processing (Everitt et al., 2003; Liu et al.,
2011). Findings such as these question frameworks that promote
appetitive and aversive processing purely in terms of distinct brain
regions. Instead, they demonstrate that some of these regions
encode factors such as salience and motivational “activation”—
not simply value.
Human studies have also attempted to dissociate the process-
ing of value from factors such as salience, intensity, or arousal.
These studies have used a wide range of tasks and focused on deci-
sion making and PE signals, as well as responses at different task
phases, including cue and outcome-related activity. The overall
logic used in human studies to attempt to dissociate value from
other factors is similar to the one used in the animal literature
(Figure 1). As before, three trial types are typically used: (1)
appetitive, (2) aversive, and (3) neutral. If activity in a region
represents “value” signals, then activation in that region for appet-
itive stimuli is expected to be greater than aversive stimuli, with
responses to neutral somewhere in between. However, if activity
represents salience or intensity, activation during both appetitive
and aversive stimuli would be greater than that observed to
neutral stimuli.
DECISION MAKING
Rangel and colleagues used a simple yet elegant decision-making
task to disentangle fMRI signals related to value and salience
(Litt et al., 2011). Participants were shown pictures of food items
that ranged from being highly disliked to highly liked and were
asked to make a choice whether or not they would like to eat the
item after the experiment (participants in fact consumed these
items following scanning). Consistent with previous animal work,
value signals were observed in medial OFC (Figure 4A; as well
as rostral ACC and PCC). Areas such as dorsal ACC, SMA, and
insula generated salience type signals as they produced stronger
responses for both “highly disliked” and “highly liked” items.
Interestingly, signals in VS exhibited both value and salience type
components consistent with the animal literature. As illustrated
in Figure 4B, such signals in fact demonstrate that “hybrid”
representations that code for both value and salience are also
possible (Litt et al., 2011).
REWARD CUE PROCESSING
Adcock and colleagues utilized a simple cue followed by response
task to dissociate value and salience signals in the VS and mid-
brain (Carter et al., 2009). In the experiment, cues signaled
the chance to win monetary rewards (“gain”) or the chance
to avoid monetary losses (“loss”) based on fast and accurate
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FIGURE 4 | Dissociation of value and salience signals during a
decision-making task. Human participants were shown pictures of food
items that ranged from being highly disliked to highly liked and were asked
to make a choice whether or not they would like to eat the item after the
experiment (participants in fact consumed these items following scanning).
For each picture, participants entered their response on one of the four
choices: “Strong No (St. No)”, “No”, “Yes” or “Strong Yes (St. Yes)”. These
four types of responses were used to define value and salience signals. The
value regressor was defined based on the parametric weights [-2 -1 1 2]
and the salience regressor was defined based on the parametric weights [2
1 1 2] corresponding to the four choices above (in that order). (A) Evidence
for value type signals found in the medial OFC. (B) Evidence for both value
and salience type signals found in the VS. Adapted from Litt et al. (2011).
performance; baseline conditions involving no gain or loss (“no-
gain”/ “no-loss”) were also employed. Cue-related activity in both
NAc and VTA increased for both gain and loss trials, thus provid-
ing evidence for salience signals in both structures. Furthermore,
in both regions, cue-related activity during gain and loss trials
was positively correlated across participants providing further
evidence for the salience account (Carter et al., 2009).
Cooper and Knutson, 2008 also found similar “salience” type
responses in the NAc while participants processed cues that signal
performance-dependent monetary gains or losses (Cooper and
Knutson, 2008; but see Knutson et al., 2001; Breiter et al., 2001).
Interestingly, when the outcomes were certain (i.e., independent
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FIGURE 5 | Dissociation of value and salience signals during a reward
processing task with humans. Each trial started with one of the six cue
types: two levels of certainty (“certain”/“uncertain”) crossed with three
levels of reward (“gain”/“neutral”/“loss”). After a variable delay period, a
visual target appeared and participants pressed a button while the target
was on the screen. The duration of the target was adjusted dynamically in
each condition separately to maintain approximately 67% task
performance. During “gain” trials participants could earn monetary reward;
during “loss” trials participants could lose money; during “neutral” trials no
win/loss occurred. During “certain” trials, outcomes were independent of
performance, whereas during “uncertain” trials outcomes were based on
performance. Value signals were found in the NAc when outcomes were
“certain” (i.e., independent of performance) and evidence for salience
signals were found when outcomes were “uncertain” (i.e., based on
performance). Adapted from Cooper and Knutson (2008).
of performance), they observed increased activity for gain com-
pared to loss cues revealing value type signals in the NAc
(Figure 5).
REWARD OUTCOME PROCESSING
Delgado and colleagues used a simple card-guessing task to inves-
tigate the neural responses related to reward and punishment
feedback (Delgado et al., 2000). Participants were asked to guess
whether the value of the unknown card would be greater or
smaller than 5. If they guessed correctly, they received monetary
reward; for incorrect guesses monetary punishment was incurred.
On neutral trials, where the value of the card turned out to be
exactly 5, there was no reward or punishment. They observed
value type signals in dorsal and VS during feedback, such that
responses were greatest for reward, weaker for neutral and weakest
for punishment trials (Delgado et al., 2000). In a follow-up study,
they observed that value responses in dorsal striatum were present
only when rewards were contingent upon behavior; they were
absent when feedback was independent of the behavior (Tricomi
et al., 2004).
RESPONSES TO UNCONDITIONED STIMULI (US)
Another class of experiment has investigated responses to pleasant
or unpleasant sensory stimuli themselves. In one case, Anderson
and colleagues independently varied the intensity and valence
of olfactory stimuli by using pleasant and unpleasant odorants
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of high and low intensity (Anderson et al., 2003). Responses in
amygdala reflected the intensity of the odor, not the valence.
In contrast, the OFC revealed value type responses. Specifically,
responses in medial OFC were stronger for pleasant compared to
unpleasant odors whereas responses in lateral OFC were stronger
for unpleasant compared to pleasant odors (Anderson et al.,
2003). In a similar study with gustatory stimuli, Parrish and col-
leagues independently varied the intensity and valence of liquids
and found similar evidence for salience signals in the amygdala
and value signals in the OFC (Small et al., 2003).
These two studies suggested a general role for the amygdala
in the coding of stimulus intensity. Yet, a follow-up study by
Dolan and colleagues using olfactory stimuli demonstrated that
the activity in the amygdala is best conceptualized in terms of an
interaction between intensity and valence—that is, an interaction
between salience and value (Winston et al., 2005). The authors
used high/low concentrations of pleasant/unpleasant/neutral
odors and reported that activity in the amygdala was increased for
high (versus low) intensity odors only when they were pleasant or
unpleasant, but not when the odor was neutral. Related valence
by intensity interactions have also been observed in the amygdala
in the animal literature (Paton et al., 2006).
PREDICTION ERROR SIGNALS
Several functional MRI studies have used Pavlovian conditioning
paradigms to attempt to dissociate value and salience encoding
based on the pattern of PE signals.
The logic of these experiments is that regions encoding value
would exhibit opposite PE signals for appetitive and aversive
stimuli, where a positive PE response would be observed when
an appetitive US is delivered or when an aversive US is omit-
ted, and a negative PE response would be observed when an
aversive US is delivered or when an appetitive US is omitted.
In contrast, regions encoding salience would exhibit similar PE
signals for both appetitive and aversive stimuli, where a posi-
tive PE would be observed for reinforced outcomes and a neg-
ative PE for unreinforced outcomes. Using this logic, Jensen
et al. (2007) reported salience type PE signals in the VS, bilat-
eral anterior insula and medial OFC. Similarly, Dreher and
colleagues reported salience type PE signals in the striatum
(bilateral putamen) and amygdala (as well as anterior insula
and ACC) (Metereau and Dreher, 2013). Notably, these studies
did not find evidence for value type PE signals in the human
brain.
Salience signals or analysis confound?
A challenge with functional MRI studies of PEs is that the PE
signal is confounded with that of US delivery (Niv, 2009). Specif-
ically, the PE is positive when the US is delivered and negative
when the US is withheld. As a consequence, a traditional multiple
regression analysis could implicate regions in the generation of PE
signals when they are actually responding simply to US delivery.
To control for this confound, researchers typically include an
additional US regressor (i.e., covariate) for each trial type along
with a “parametric” regressor to capture variance related to the
PE. Figure 6 illustrates this situation. Unfortunately, this strategy
could itself spuriously lead to PE-related activity. For instance,
imagine a region that simply responds to the US (e.g., insula
activated by electric shock) but has no role in encoding PEs.
When a single US regressor tries to account for variance during
both reinforced and unreinforced shock outcomes as typically
done, the estimated regression coefficient would be somewhere
midway between the activity evoked by reinforced and unrein-
forced outcomes. Hence, the unaccounted variance in this region
would have a positive value (i.e., residual) during reinforced
outcomes and a negative value (i.e., residual) during unreinforced
outcomes. This overall pattern qualitatively matches the shape
of the PE regressor. Therefore, one could spuriously detect PE
type signals in regions that simply respond to US delivery. Some
functional MRI studies have avoided this problem (McClure et al.,
2003; D’Ardenne et al., 2008).
SIMULTANEOUS MANIPULATION OF APPETITIVE AND AVERSIVE
STIMULI
The work that we have discussed so far has considered appetitive
and aversive information in isolation. A few recent studies have
used stimuli that simultaneously incorporate appetitive and aver-
sive information to further understand the role of different brain
regions in processing value and/or salience type signals.
In a decision making paradigm, Tobler and colleagues investi-
gated two kinds of salience signals that can only be distinguished
in decisions that involve simultaneous costs and benefits (Kahnt
and Tobler, 2013). When appetitive and aversive stimuli are
presented in isolation, salience can be captured by the absolute
value of the stimulus (i.e., |App| or |Aver|). But when appetitive
and aversive stimuli are presented simultaneously, salience could
be of two types: one based on the absolute value of the “total” (i.e.,
|App + Aver|), another based on the sum of the absolute values
(i.e., |App| + |Aver|). Tobler and colleagues found evidence for
the latter type of salience signal in a site in the temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ). Consistent with previous studies, they also found
evidence for value based signals in the VS (though they did not
detect salience-related signals in the VS). A handful of additional
decision making studies have used simultaneous appetitive and
aversive stimuli to the same effect (Talmi et al., 2009; Park et al.,
2011).
In a recent study, we were also interested in characterizing
responses to stimuli containing both appetitive and aversive infor-
mation. In the study, we investigated the interactions between
the anticipation of reward and/or threat (Choi et al., 2013).
Participants were presented with four advance cues to alert them
of the possibility of: (1) reward/no shock, (2) reward/shock,
(3) no reward/no shock, and (4) no reward/shock. Reward was
contingent on performance whereas shock was independent of
performance. This procedure juxtaposed two competing ideas.
One, in line with what we have been discussing, for conditions
involving simultaneous reward and threat, enhanced activity
would reflect a type of salience signal (given the presence of
both dimensions); the other predicted that the presence of both
appetitive and aversive stimuli would lead to a “competition”
between them. Skin conductance data acquired during scanning
demonstrated an interaction between reward and threat process-
ing, such that reward and threat effects were reduced by threat
and reward, respectively. In terms of brain responses, several brain
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FIGURE 6 | Prediction error (PE) signal analysis and potential confounds
in fMRI analysis. (A) In a typical appetitive Pavlovian conditioning paradigm,
one visual cue (CSneutral; not shown) is associated with no-reward (100%
probability) whereas a second visual cue (CSreward) is associated with 50%
probability of receiving reward. PE (i.e., actual minus expected outcomes)
measured at the outcome phase of CSreward trials. (B) Simulated fMRI time
series data (blue) generated using 10 reinforced and 10 unreinforced outcome
events of CSreward trials in a pseudorandom order with 15 s separation
between events at a typical TR of 2.5 s. For the sake of simplicity, we have
not considered CSneutral trials and the cue phase of CSreward trials (which are
typically modeled as separate regressors) and no noise was added to the
simulated data. (C) When a single outcome phase regressor is used to
account for variance during both reinforced and unreinforced outcomes of
CSreward trials as typically done, the estimated regression coefficient would be
somewhere midway between the activity evoked by reinforced and
unreinforced outcomes, as demonstrated by the estimated data fit (red). (D)
Hence, the residual time series data (green) will show positive values during
reinforced outcome events and negative values during unreinforced outcome
events. (E) Parametric regressor based on trial-by-trial fluctuations of PE
values at the outcome phase of CSreward trials calculated using the
Rescorla-Wagner rule (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972) (a learning rate of 0.25
was used as often used in fMRI studies). (F) The residual time series and the
PE regressors are overlaid to show the high correlation between them.
Because of this, unaccounted variance during the outcome phase related
activity of CSreward trials could be “spuriously” accounted by the PE
regressor.
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areas exhibited this type of reward-threat trade-off, including
midbrain, caudate, putamen, and anterior insula.
LIMITATIONS OF FUNCTIONAL MRI STUDIES
Single unit recordings in midbrain and VS have identified separate
populations of neurons coding for value and salience (Matsumoto
and Hikosaka, 2009; Bissonette et al., 2013). The coarse spa-
tial resolution of typical functional MRI studies prevents them
from measuring separate signals for the separate populations.
Indeed, in some cases, the measured fMRI response could be
based on the combined activity of underlying value and salience
processing neurons. Consider also single-unit studies revealing
separate populations of neurons coding for appetitive and aversive
stimuli (e.g., Ungless et al., 2004). In such cases, if a region
shows salience type fMRI responses, it could be due to the con-
tribution from separate underlying neuronal populations, which
would be engaged by appetitive and aversive stimuli. But here
it is worthwhile noting that some single-unit studies in humans
(Laxton et al., 2013) and monkeys (Amemori and Graybiel, 2012;
Monosov and Hikosaka, 2012) have revealed neurons coding
for appetitive and aversive stimuli within the same population.
These studies, together with human studies that revealed the
dependence of valence signals on their salience (e.g., during active
versus passive task processing) are consistent, in broad terms, with
meta-analytic findings reporting little evidence for processing of
discrete emotion categories in distinct brain regions (Lindquist
et al., 2012).
A second issue is that the sluggish nature of hemodynamic
responses makes it challenging to unambiguously disambiguate
responses to different task phases, for example, “cue”, “antic-
ipation”, and “outcome” phases. In contrast, the high tempo-
ral resolution of electrophysiology provides rich information to
investigate the dynamics of value and salience representations
(e.g., Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009). Importantly, high tempo-
ral resolution in single unit studies also allows the investigation of
responses at the outcome phase independent from short-latency
responses linked to the sensory properties of US (Fiorillo et al.,
2013).
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we reviewed how the brain encodes appetitive
and aversive events in both non-human animals and humans.
This line of research is important, as understanding the neural
processing behind appetitive and aversive stimuli is critical to
understand what drives different behavioral responses. Much of
the literature has approached these problems by studying how an
animal associates a particular odor with a potential predator, or
by investigating how a visual cue is associated with a tasty ripe
fruit. The behaviors enacted in each of those scenarios would
be, naturally, very different (alertly avoid, or boldly engage).
However, few situations in real life are as cut and dry. Often,
predators prowl near locations and objects that prey animals enjoy
(near watering holes, food sources, migratory routes, following
the mating calls of animals), and attaining rewards may require
dealing with cues that signal aversive events (extracting honey
from wild bees, picking fruit from thorny plants).
As reviewed here, despite differences in the species investigated
and the techniques utilized, some consensus has started to emerge
regarding the encoding of both value and other related motiva-
tional signals. Yet, both apparent discrepancies and unresolved
issues remain and need to be addressed in future work. The
combined evidence reveals that the OFC has a representation
of value that is relatively “pure”. The VS carries both value and
salience signals that appear to be generated by different neuronal
populations. Amygdala responses are modulated by stimulus
intensity, though the signal is clearly moderated by the valence
(i.e., value) of the stimulus.
Taken together, the work described here suggests a circuit by
which OFC represents value expectancies necessary for guiding
decision-making and learning. These signals depend on ABL,
which not only encodes associative appetitive and aversive infor-
mation during sampling of conditioned stimuli and across states,
but integrates value and intensity/salience during delivery of
appetitive and aversive outcomes. OFC and ABL both broadcast
this information to VS and DA neurons, which carry both eval-
uative (VTA) and motivational salience (SNc) signals in separate
populations of neurons (Figure 7). PE signals generated by VTA
DA neurons provide feed-forward information to more dorsal-
medial and dorsal-lateral regions in striatum, which are critical
for goal-directed and habitual behaviors, respectively. Parietal and
ACC likely increase attentional control to ensure that neural pro-
cesses are prioritized depending on expected actions and unsigned
errors in reward prediction. From this research it is clear that we
have to continue to compare and contrast how neural systems
reconcile both appetitive and aversive stimuli, and continue to
disambiguate the meaning of signals modulated by valence and
how they relate to subsequent behavior.
In terms of issues that will drive future research, we can high-
light at least three. The first concerns the types of representation
FIGURE 7 | Circuit diagram demonstrating connectivity between brain
regions and their relative location on a sliding scale of value to
salience, with the influence of DA signaling integrated. Gradient bars
represent relative encoding of value and salience. Orbitofrontal
Cortex—OFC, Prefrontal Cortex—PFC, Basolateral Amygdala—ABL,
Anterior Cingulate Cortex—ACC, Parietal Cortex—Parietal, Dorsal Medial
Striatum—DMS, Dorsal Lateral Striatum—DLS, Ventral Tegmental
Area—VTA, Substantia Nigra compacta—SNc, Superior Colliculus—SC,
GP—Globus Pallidus, Thalamus—Thal, Substantia Nigra reticulata—SNr,
Premotor Cortex—PM.
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in parietal cortex. Are they closer to value based or are they better
conceptualized in terms of salience? The second concerns the
study of PEs in the human brain with functional MRI. As illus-
trated, it can be challenging to separate “true” PEs from responses
to US delivery. Consequently, it is unclear at the moment if PE
signals reflect salience representations across a wider set of regions
of the brain as suggested by the human work (e.g., insula, dorsal
striatum, amygdala, ACC), or if in some cases they may have
resulted from responses to the US itself. This is an area that
we believe future work is clearly needed, both non-human work
investigating a wider group of regions, and human work that
more effectively deals with potential confounds. A third issue is
related to functional MRI as a methodology. Both issues of spatial
and temporal resolution pose important challenges to being able
to investigate value signals in the brain. These clearly need to
be addressed more effectively; perhaps with newer techniques
that allow finer temporal sampling (every 500 ms or less) of
hemodynamic responses and finer spatial resolution (less than
1 mm) can go some way toward mitigating current issues (though
higher temporal sampling can only go so far given the low-pass
nature of the hemodynamic response). In any case, we anticipate
exciting times ahead as the field advances the understanding of
how the brain encodes value and other motivational variables.
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